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There is a growing recognition that infectious diseases can easily spill
across national borders and threaten global peace and stability. This has
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“..the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and
security”
– UN Security Council Resolution 1308 (2000).
1 Introduction
There is a growing recognition that infectious diseases can easily spill across
national borders and threaten global peace and stability. This has resulted
in a change in focus from health being an component of development to also
being an important consideration for security (McInnes and Lee, 2006). It
is perhaps not surprising that most of this renewed emphasis has been on the
HIV/AIDS pandemic. In US, intelligence reports warned that HIV/AIDS
“could trigger ethnic wars and genocide and undermine democratic govern-
ments” (BBC, May 1, 2000). This realisation led to a shift in US government
policy on HIV/AIDS (Gow 2002). Voicing similar concerns the UN High
Level Panel has identified infectious diseases and in particular HIV/AIDS
as one of the significant global threats of the 21st Century. This view
has in general been supported by several governments including the Euro-
pean Union. This paper explores the interlinkages between HIV/AIDS and
state failure by empirically testing for any direct impact of HIV on several
indicators of state failure.
Concerns with infectious diseases aﬀecting state security are not new.
However, the scale and the nature of HIV/AIDS makes it unrivalled to any
other diseases in the past. Over the last two decades more than 20 million
people have died of AIDS and today close to 40 million people live with
HIV (UNAIDS/WHO 2006). The impact of this deadly disease has mostly
been felt in Sub-Saharan Africa where society and government resources are
being stretched thin in the wake of this pandemic. Some of the poorest
countries are also the ones which are being aﬀected most severely. For
instance, Swaziland which has a HIV prevalence rate of 33% is one of the
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poorest countries with a Human Poverty Index of 52.5%. Similarly Zambia
with a HIV prevalence of 17% has 75% of its population below $1 a day.
To understand the full impact of this disease, it is important to investigate
whether resource constrained countries such as Swaziland or Zambia, would
be able to overcome the burden of this disease?
The literature has mainly focussed on broad discussions of the causal
pathways through which HIV/AIDS can manifest itself into a global secu-
rity risk ( Feldbaum et al 2006). First there are concerns that strategic
human resources such as soldiers or peace keepers may be disproportion-
ately aﬀected by the disease and in some cases may be the vectors of the
disease (Tripodi and Patel, 2004; Elbe 2002). This would reduce their eﬀec-
tiveness and thus would reduce the states ability to maintain law and order.
The second growing concern is that states with high prevalence of HIV, will
be unable to cope with the strains of the disease, and will eventually become
a failed state. States with high levels of HIV, may loose their prime age
labour force, thus resulting in a low productivity and a genuine shortage of
human capital. These together in turn will erode government institutions
through low resource accumulation and hamper their ability to implement
policy and deliver public goods and services. The breakdown in the insti-
tutions will eventually make the state fragile. This worrying implication
of HIV has in today’s world given rise to strategic concerns with regards to
the fight against terrorism. It has led the US State Department to use HIV
prevalence as an indicator with which to characterize failed states (Fourie
2006).
Yet, in the absence of proper empirical foundations, both these causal
pathways from HIV/AIDS to state failure has been questioned. Barnett
and Prins (2006) in their report find no conclusive evidence to suggest that
soldiers may be disproportionately aﬀected by the disease. In a recent paper
Young (2005) demonstrated that HIV will lead to a higher standard of living
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for the future generations. The argument is that lower population will
indeed increase overall labour productivity. Following this line of reasoning
one would come to the conclusion that HIV prevalence in the long run would
eventually make the countries economically stronger and the institutions
viable thus contradicting the earlier hypothesis that high HIV prevalence
will create failed states.
Peterson and Shellman (2006) is one of the very few papers to provide
an empirical analysis of the impact of AIDS on state fragility. Based on the
AIDS data for 1999-2000 and using a 3SLS estimation they find that while
AIDS does not have any direct impact on state fragility, it does indirectly
result in state failure through its impact on socioeconomic and political
factors.1 In this paper, we mainly test for the direct eﬀect of HIV on
state failure using cross-country regressions. To distill the eﬀect of HIV
prevalence rate on state failure we control for a broader set of variables that
may eﬀect state failure. To check for robustness, we examine the impact
of HIV on state failure under diﬀerent specifications. Further, given that
state failure is itself a complex concept, and has multiple meanings, in our
analysis we include several diﬀerent measures (discussed later) to represent
state failure. Similar to Peterson and Shellman (2006) we do not find any
conclusive evidence of a direct impact of HIV on state failure.
The next section of the paper discusses the diﬀerent measure of state
failure used in this paper. Section 3 describes the data used in this paper
and Section 4 provides the empirical analysis. The final section concludes
the paper.
1 It is, however, not clear from their paper whether the coeﬃcients derived through
3SLS (or 2SLS) is significantly diﬀerent from OLS estimates. In particular, the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman specification test is not reported. If there is no significant diﬀerence between
the OLS and 3SLS estimates, then OLS is to be prefered on the grounds of being more
eﬃcient estimators.
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2 Concepts of State Failure
Before we start our empirical investigation it is important to define some
of the concepts clearly, particularly those related to a country’s instabil-
ity. The central hypothesis that we want to investigate is whether high
prevalence of HIV indeed makes states weak and more prone to instability.
However, what is meant by state failure is unclear, given that by its very na-
ture an ambiguous and diﬃcult concept to capture. In the literature there
are several interpretation of state failure and terms are used interchangeably.
For instance, state failure has been interpreted as institutional failure; it has
also been interpreted as inability of a country to cope with shocks, natural
and economic; political instability is commonly as an indicator for state
failure as is conflict.
In this paper, to overcome the definitional ambiguity, we use three diﬀer-
ent measures of state failure that captures diﬀerent aspects of the concept,
each with its diﬀerent strengths and weakness. One of the first measures of
state failure, that we term as fragility, is derived from two indicators: cor-
ruption and conflict. High levels of corruption in a country reflects serious
issues of governance and also to quite an extent demonstrates institutional
failures. Corruption reduces the eﬀectiveness of government policy, can
result in a distrust of the government and seriously weaken a government.
The other indicator that we consider for our measure of fragility is the ratio
of military expenditure to GDP. The intuition is that a higher proportion of
military expenditure indicates greater level of conflicts that a country may
be embroiled in Nadir (1999) has found that countries with higher military
expenditure has higher levels of conflict thus lending empirical validity to
the intuition. Let Ci ∈ [0, 1] be an measure of corruption in country i
and MEi ∈ [0, 1] be an index of military expenditure. Fragility, Fi, then
by our definition is an equally weighted average of corruption and military
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expenditure, i.e.,
Fi = 0.5Ci + 0.5MEi. (1)
An issue that may be raised with this measure is that although we have
derived the corruption index from the ordinally scaled corruption perception
index (CPI), we have interpreted the index as a cardinal scale. Therefore,
what we are assuming is that if the corruption index is interpreted cardinally
then doubling of the index would reflect twice the amount of corruption,
whereas under an ordinal interpretation a doubling of the index may reflect
more than twice or even less then twice the level of corruption. While
this may be a valid criticism of the measure, given the hidden nature of
corruption, whether this diﬀerence in interpretation significantly alters the
fragility measure cannot be ascertained. In the literature, however, most
empirical papers on corruption using the CPI do interpret it cardinally (see
for instance Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004)).
The next measure of state failure that we will employ, which mainly
has an economic dimension, is the oft used economic vulnerability index
(EVI) by Bruguglio and Galea (2003). The underlying intuition is that
proness of a country to shocks (both economic and natural) depends on
certain economic factors that includes a country’s, (a)level of openness (with
respect to trade), (b)dependence on limited number exports, (c)dependence
on strategic imports and finally (d) whether the country is accessible or
insular. So for instance if the country is extremely open to international
trade (i.e. has a high trade to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio) it will
be more vulnerable to trade shocks. Similarly if it is dependent on exports of
one or two commodities or imports of vital commodities, any small shocks in
the trade flows of those commodities will make the country more vulnerable.
In our context, the shocks to trade flows can arrive through a pandemic such
as HIV which may eﬀect production for those vital commodities. So for
instance, if a country’s exports are concentrated on a few agricultural goods
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and if the migrant labour needed for the production of those goods are the
ones who are most severely aﬀected by the disease, then this may have a
serious knock-on eﬀect on exports and the balance of trade.
The EVI is a composite index, which aggregates over these four diﬀerent
dimension using the following indicators: (a) ratio of trade to GDP (TRi),
(b) concentration ratio of in trade of goods and services (CRi), (c) ratio
of imported to domestically produced energy (ERi) and (d) the ratio of
transport and freight costs to imports (FCi). Therefore,
EV Ii = 0.25TRi + 0.25CRi + 0.25ERi + 0.25ERi. (2)
The final measure of state failure that we use in this paper captures
the coping abilities of countries when faced with shocks. The measure, de-
veloped by Bruguglio et al (2004), is intended to account for the inherent
resilience that a country may have.. Similar to the EVI, the resilience index,
RIi ∈ [0, 1], is a composite measure that includes (a) macro economic sta-
bility (MSi) (b) microeconomic eﬃciency (MEi), (c) governance (Gi) and
(d) social development (SDi). Hence,
RIi = 0.25MSi + 0.25MEi + 0.25Gi + 0.25SDi. (3)
Each of these components are themselves a composite index of several other
variables. The macroeconomic stability component includes, fiscal deficit,
external debt along with inflation and unemployment; microeconomic eﬃ-
ciency takes in to account the size of the government and trade restrictions
such as tariﬀs which may eﬀect eﬃciency; governance captures judicial in-
dependence, rule of law including protection of property rights; social de-
velopment includes life expectancy at birth and adult literacy rate. What
the measure in essence captures is a country’s ability to both resist and re-
cover from shocks. Inability of a country to do just that can be thought
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of as its failure and hence irresilience (IR), measured as (1 − RIi), can be
an indicator of state failure (Ikpe (2007)). In this paper we are interested
in irresilience because HIV/AIDS can eﬀect the diﬀerent dimensions that
the measure captures. For instance, high levels of HIV/AIDS can lead to
unemployment, may eﬀect the size of the government and it will definitely
reduce life expectancy.
3 Data
In this section we provide a broad discussion of some of the key variables of
interest. For our analysis, we create a data set around each of the diﬀerent
indicators of state failure discussed above, resulting in three diﬀerent data
sets. We cover roughly between 80 to 100 countries in our depending on
the measure of state failure. Specifically for fragility we cover around 100
countries, whereas for the other two measures we have around 86 countries.
The Appendix shows the countries covered under the diﬀerent measures.
Our HIV prevalence data covers 2003 and 2005 and is from UNAIDS/WHO.
This is a much improved data compared to other data sets on HIV/AIDS
(Ghys et al (2006)). Although, for both years range estimates are available
for HIV prevalence, we have only considered the point estimates. Where
the point estimates were not available we have considered the minimum
value from the range estimates. For our purpose we have derived the HIV
prevalence data for 2004 through a linear extrapolation from 2003 and 2005
data. Presuming there is no substantial volatility in the HIV data, the
extrapolated estimates will a close approximation.
The data on corruption is the Transparency International (2003) Cor-
ruption Perception Index (CPI). It is a survey of international business
persons on their perception of corruption in a country on a scale of 0 to
10 with 10 indicating lowest levels of corruption. This is the most widely
available data on corruption and has been used in cross country studies. For
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the purposes of the paper we constructed an index from this data such that
the index varies between [0,1], with 0 representing lowest corruption. There
are, however, serious limitations in using this data in a cardinal fashion.
The EVI and the RI is adapted from Bruguglio and Galea (2003) and
Bruguglio et al (2004) . However, it is not really clear from both these
papers about the exact sources and time period of their data. The data
they use to construct their index is from 2002 to 2004. So the vulnerability
index that we use for 2003 and 2004 may not be really aligned to those years.
Among our variables of interest, we also include two diﬀerent measures
of inequality. For income inequality, we took the reported Gini from the
World Income Inequality Database (WIDER (2007)). We also consider the
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation (ELF) index to represent socio-cultural in-
equalities. The index calculates the probability that any two person picked
in random within a country, will come from diﬀerent ethinic and liguistic
background. The ELF data is from Okediji (2005) who uses the same mea-
sure as Taylor and Hudson (1972). We also use the Freedom House Index
(2007) rankings of countries based on political rights and civil liberties as
an indicator of democracy. Other variables of interest that we consider for
our analysis, such as public health expenditure, per capita Gross National
Income (GNI), military expenditure, inflation and Human Development In-
dexes (HDI) have been mainly extracted from the Human Development Re-
ports (UNDP 2003, 2004) and the World Development Indicators (World
Bank 2006). We describe each of the three data sets in detail in the follow-
ing section.
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4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Fragility
Our data sample is for the year 2003 and the variables that we consider
reflects dimensions, apart from HIV prevalence rate, that may help explain
fragility. We consider the ratio of public expenditure on health to GDP
and the Human Development Index (HDI) in the analysis to capture broad
social development trends. The per capita Gross National Income (GNI)
indicates the level of economic development. The Freedom Index (FI) re-
flects the level of political and civil participation that people enjoy. In other
words the index can be thought of as a measure of democracy. Typically,
conflict, which by our definition is a part of fragility, is exacerbated through
inequalities. We, therefore, include both the Gini coeﬃcient and the ethno-
linguistic fragmentation index (ELF) to capture both income inequality and
sociocultural divisions. We also include dummy variables for Africa and
Islam because both typically one would expect these countries to be both
conflict and corruption prone and hence fragile. The data is summarised in
the following Table
Insert Table 1
It is clear from Table 1 that there are large variations in the number of
countries covered by the diﬀerent variables. Out of the 101 countries, 23
are from Africa and 24 of the countries are Islamic.
To understand the broad relationship among the variables, we calculate
the pairwise correlation between each of these variables shown below
Insert Table 2
As expected the correlation matrix shows that fragility is positively corre-
lated with the two indicators of inequality (ELF and the Gini). African
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countries and Islamic countries also are more prone to conflict. It is inter-
esting to note that while HIV has a positive correlation with fragility, the
correlation is not statistically significant. The factors that are negatively
correlated with fragility in an increasing order are the HDI, freedom index,
ratio of public expenditure on health and per capita income. When it comes
to considering the correlation of HIV with other variables, the negative and
significant eﬀect of Africa is clear. Interestingly the other factors that are
negatively correlated with HIV are the two inequality indicators.
Although the correlation matrix gives us an broad indication of the link
between the diﬀerent variables, it only shows the partial correlations, i.e., it
does not tell us what the correlations are among two variables, in the pres-
ence of other variables. Therefore, to estimate the eﬀect of HIV prevalence
on fragility, Fi, we use the OLS regression
Fi = α+ βHIVi + γXi + δZi + ui (4)
where Xi is a vector of variables present in all specifications of (4), Zi repre-
sents the vector of variables accounted in some specifications of (4) but not
all, and ui is the error term. We compute seven diﬀerent specifications of
(4), and the results are presented in Table 3.
Insert Table 3
The significance of Islamic dummy in (1) indicates that Islamic countries
may be quite fragile. This relationship, however, may actually be driven
by other factors such as income, public health expenditure or inequalities.
The rest of the specifications controls for diﬀerent variables of interest.
Several broad trends seems to emerge from these diﬀerent specifications.
First, specifications (5), (6) and (7) highlights that income is negatively and
significantly associated with fragility. In other words, countries with high
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income are less fragile. Along similar lines Nafziger and Auvinen (2002)
also found that higher income reduces conflict. More interestingly, in the
presence of income, inequalities are not significantly correlated with fragility.
Second, as specification (4) shows, social development (as measured by HDI),
is also negatively and significantly correlated with fragility. As in the case of
income, in the presence of HDI inequalities are not correlated with fragility.
Third, (2) (3) and (4) indicates that higher freedom, which we take as an
indicator of democracy, is associated with lower fragility. Political and civil
liberties do reduce the chances of intra-state conflict but it also indicates that
these liberties, perhaps through giving voices to the people, acts as a bulwark
against corruption. Fourth, for most of the specifications HIV prevalence
does not eﬀect fragility, however, in the presence of HDI in specification (4),
it is negatively associated with fragility. In other words as HIV increase,
fragility decreases. One explanation for this may be that when HDI is
controlled, an increase in HIV prevalence rate means that more funding
needs to go towards health care and social development to maintain similar
levels of HDI, which then is associated with lower fragility. We also find in
specification (1) that HIV has a significant and positive impact on fragility,
however comparison of the R2 indicates that (1) may not as robust as (4).
4.2 Vulnerability
For the vulnerability index (EVI) we have data for 2003 and 2004 across 86
countries. This gives us an opportunity to construct a panel data to eval-
uate the eﬀect of HIV prevalence on vulnerability. Since the EVI captures
economic vulnerability we take in to consideration variables such as infla-
tion which may eﬀect trade balances and hence vulnerability. The other
control variables that we consider are military expenditure, freedom index
along with the per capita GNI and HDI. A summary of the data is given
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in the following table
Insert Table 4.
The number of observation is diﬀerent for each variable with EVI covering
86 countries over two periods and HIV prevalence covering 78 countries over
the same period. The correlation matrix, which indicates the broad links
among the variables of interest, is as follows
Insert Table 5.
Table 5 indicates that there is no significant correlation between EVI and
the other variables of interest including HDI and Income per capita. As
mentioned above, however, the pairwise correlations between variables may
change when we control for other variables. Therefore, we run panel re-
gressions, both fixed and random eﬀect, of HIV on EVI. The fixed eﬀect
regression that we estimate is
EV Iit = αi + βXit + uit, (5)
where αi captures the state specific eﬀects, EVit is the poverty head count
ratio for country i in year t, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables such as,
inflation, military expenditure, per capita income and the human develop-
ment index. uit is the error term. Similarly the random eﬀects regression
is as follows
EV Iit = α+ βXit + εi + uit, (6)
where εi v N(0, σ2ε) represents the country specific random eﬀects.
The results for the random eﬀects are presented in Table 6 below.
Insert Table 6
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The HIV prevalence rate and inflation are included in all the five specifi-
cations while the rest of the variables are controlled in at least one of the
specifications. Several interesting results emerge from the random eﬀect
regressions. First, as expected, inflation is positively and significantly cor-
related with fragility in all the specifications. Second, income per capita
also plays a significant role but quite surprisingly it eﬀects vulnerability
positively, i.e. rich countries will be more vulnerable. While it is quite
acceptable that higher inflation can make a country more economically vul-
nerable by distorting terms of trade and thereby eﬀecting terms of trade
flows, it can be quite surprising to observe that under specifications (4) and
(5) higher GNI per capita will lead to increased EVI. However, the latter
fact may not be so counter intuitive since some of the richer countries are
more open in terms of their economy and recall that openness is a criteria
in the EVI. So if a country has become richer through more trade, then
a higher GNI per capita may well reflect a higher vulnerability. Third,
HIV prevalence rates does not increase vulnerability which implies a lack of
direct eﬀect from HIV to economic vulnerability.
We also ran these five models under fixed eﬀects, the results of which
are presented in Table 7.
Insert Table 7
Similar to the random eﬀects regression, we run five diﬀerent specifications
for the fixed eﬀect regressions with HIV prevalence rate and inflation in-
cluded in all the specifications. In none of the specifications HIV preva-
lence rate has a significant impact on economic vulnerability. However, this
could be because there is very little variation in the HIV prevalence rate
between the two years. The role of inflation is also less stronger compared
to the random eﬀects model in the sense that it is not significant under all
the diﬀerent specifications. Still it retains the positive sign, indicating that
inflation worsens vulnerability. Income retains its positive correlation with
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economic vulnerability, but the coeﬃcient are much stronger. HDI also
shows a positive and significant eﬀect on vulnerability, i.e. higher HDI like
income and inflation, worsens economic vulnerability.
To check between whether to consider fixed and random eﬀects regres-
sion, for each of the five models, we ran both the Breusch-Pagan test and the
Hausman tests. The Hausman test checks for the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients
between random eﬀect and fixed eﬀect models, where as the Breusch-Pagan
test checks for the presence of random eﬀects. For all the models, both
the tests indicate that random eﬀects is a more appropriate model. Thus,
to summarise, HIV prevalence rate does not have any impact on economic
vulnerability.
4.3 Irresilience Index
The last measure of state failure that we consider is the irresilience index
for 86 countries which is the obverse of resilience. The sample consists of
12 African and 15 Islamic countries. The data, summarised below, is for
the 2004 mainly because the resilience index is only available for that year.
Insert Table 8
The variables that we consider here are similar to those that we consid-
ered for fragility which includes economic and social development indicators,
measures of inequality, a variable for democracy and HIV prevalence. We
haven’t been able to include, the public spending on health because of a
lack of data for 2004. We also included two new variables: growth of HIV
prevalence rate and tuberculosis (TB) rate. The growth of HIV prevalence
is calculated as the average growth rate in HIV prevalence over the two years
from 2003 to 2005. Including this helps one to distinguish whether it is the
level of HIV prevalence rate or the growth of it that eﬀects resilience. Note
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that there are countries with negative growth rate and the mean growth is
quite close to zero. In our earlier analysis of fragility we could not include
this variable because there were no reliable data available for HIV preva-
lence rate before 2003. The other variable , TB rate which is only available
for 2004, have been included because we thought that it would allow us to
conduct some interesting comparative analysis with HIV on its impact on
irresilience.
As before, we calculate the correlation matrix between the diﬀerent vari-
ables of interest.
Insert Table 9
Irresilience is correlated, as expected with most of the variables of interest.
Thus, measures of inequality, both ELF and the gini coeﬃcient, it is posi-
tively correlated, i.e. as inequality increase, countries become less resilient.
On other hand with more economic and social development countries become
more resilient. Note that with HIV prevalence rate irresilience is positively
correlated. When it comes to HIV growth rate, it indicates that with higher
HIV growth, higher resilience, however, the correlation is not significant. It
is also interesting to note that TB has a higher positive correlation with
irresilience than HIV.
To estimate the eﬀect of HIV prevalence rate on irresilience (IR) under
diﬀerent specifications we use the following regression
IRi = α+ βHIVi + γXi + δZi + ui
where Xi are the variables in all the specifications (in our case its is the
Islamic and Africa dummy) and Zi is the vector of the variables of interest
used as control variables under diﬀerent specifications. The results from
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the analysis is presented in Table 10
Insert Table 10
The first six specifications looks at the eﬀect of HIV prevalence rate on
irresilience controlling for diﬀerent variables. Specification (7) investigates
whether TB has any eﬀect on irresilience.
Under all the six diﬀerent specifications we find that HIV prevalence rate
has no significant impact on resilience. There is, however, some evidence
that HIV growth rate may have a negative eﬀect on irresilience (specification
(5)). What it implies, is that higher HIV growth may improve resilience,
but the reason behind it is not immediately apparent. For countries having
negative HIV growth, this implies a lower level of resilience. The results
also indicate that both HDI and income per capita have an significant and
negative impact on irresilience. When it comes to the inequality measures
we find counter intuitive result in some cases. Consider specification (6),
which has the highest R2 of 0.81 and yet a higher ELF, which indicates higher
sociocultural inequalities, will lead to greater resilience. This significant and
negative association of ELF on irresilience is also evident in (7). Again,
the reason behind such results are not clear. When it comes to income
inequality, however, it has a positive and significant impact on irresilience
(specification (3)), but not in the other specifications. Finally, unlike HIV
prevalence rate, a higher TB rate would reduce resilience. But as Table 9
shows that TB and HIV rates are highly correlated, which then might imply
that although HIV may not have a direct impact on resilience, it may eﬀect
resilience through other variables such as TB.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we attempted to under take a rigorous empirical study of the
impact of HIV on state failure. We have considered three plausible measures
of state failure and regressed them on HIV prevalence rate and a broad set
of control variables. Overall, we do not find any conclusive evidence of a
direct impact of HIV on state fragility. However, delving a little deeper
in to the details we find that depending on the state failure measure the
impact of HIV is diﬀerent. For the economic vulnerability index and the
irresilience index, HIV does not have any direct impact. On the other hand
for the fragility index there is some evidence of HIV having a significant
eﬀect but the direction of the impact (whether positive or negative) remains
inconclusive.
The analysis to quite an extent has been hampered by the lack of data
particularly of the fragility indicators and the HIV prevalence rates. The
indicators of state failure used in this paper also may not be satisfacto-
rily capturing the notion of a failed state. What is a good measure of state
failure is still an open question and how best to integrate the diﬀerent dimen-
sions of state failure to form a composite index remains unclear. The HIV
prevalence rates which are available for only 2003 and 2005, does not have
much variation, thus giving very little information on disease progression.
This prevents a temporal understanding of the interlinkages between state
failure and HIV. As better data over a longer horizon becomes available, a
more robust analysis of the link from HIV to fragility can be performed.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics: fragility 
 
Variables Observation Mean  Standard. 
deviation 
Min  Max 
Fragility 101 0.381 0.134 0.02 0.591 
HIV 100 1.956 4.469 0.05 24 
Islam  
Dummy 101 0.228 0.421 0 1 
Africa Dummy 101 0.238 0.428 0 1 
Public Health 
Expenditure to 
GDP 
100 3.638 2.130 0.5 8.8 
Ethno-Linguisitc 
Fragmentation 
(ELF) 
50 36.640 29.567 1 89 
Freedom index 100 0.670 0.290 0 1 
HDI 100 0.732 0.175 0.298 0.963 
GNI per capita  100 7916.500 11727.830 150 44230 
Inequality 73 41.241 11.212 22.1 60.9 
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Table 2.  Pair wise Correlation: Fragility 
 
Variables Fragility HIV Islam Dummy 
Africa 
Dummy 
Ratio of 
Public Health 
Expenditure 
to GDP 
ELF Freedom index HDI 
GNI per 
capita Inequality 
Fragility 1          
HIV 0.124 1         
Islam 
Dummy 0.404* -0.111 1      
  
Africa Dummy 0.251* 0.587* 0.307* 1       
Ratio of Public Health 
Expenditure to GDP -0.723* -0.143 -0.419* -0.323* 1    
  
 ELF 0.486* 0.317* 0.397* 0.413* -0.595* 1     
Freedom index -0.693* -0.058 -0.619* -0.305* 0.673* -0.481* 1    
HDI -0.641* -0.485* -0.424* -0.684* 0.690* -0.619* 0.557* 1   
GNI per capita -0.830* -0.215* -0.316* -0.331* 0.778* -0.475* 0.596* 0.687* 1  
Inequality 0.555* 0.290* 0.111 0.325* -0.671* 0.297 -0.434* -0.697* -0.596* 1 
Note:  * indicates significance at 5% 
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Table 3. OLS estimates: Fragility 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
HIV 0.004* (0.002) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Islam  
Dummy 
0.130* 
(0.022) 
-0.009 
(0.063) 
-0.028 
(0.040) 
1.36x10-5 
(0.027) 
0.088* 
(0.036) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
0.049** 
(0.028) 
Africa 
Dummy 
0.015 
(0.024) 
-0.012 
(0.032) 
-0.030 
(0.027) 
-0.124* 
(0.039) 
0.009 
(0.035) 
-0.021 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.037) 
Ratio of 
Public Health 
Expenditure 
to GDP 
 -0.024* (0.007) 
-0.013** 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
ELF  3.65x10
-5 
(0.005x10-1)   
9.36x10-5 
(0.001)   
Freedom 
index  
-0.304* 
(0.118) 
-0.237* 
(0.065)   
-0.136* 
(0.039)  
HDI    -0.886* (0.171)    
GNI per 
capita (x10-6)     
-7.13* 
(1.90) 
-7.19* 
(1.00) 
-7.66* 
(1.12) 
Inequality   0.003* (0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001)   
0.002 
(0.001) 
Constant 0.338* (0.018) 
0.668* 
(0.095) 
0.460* 
(0.089) 
1.101* 
(0.174) 
0.429* 
(0.039) 
0.531* 
(0.026) 
0.354* 
(0.070) 
Number of 
Observation 
100 
 50 
71 
 
71 
 
50 
 
98 
 
71 
 
R2 0.197 0.709 0.594 0.639 0.743 0.762 0.712 
F test 13.39* 24.11* 14.86* 21.62* 25.90* 31.95* 32.49* 
Notes:  The values in the parenthesis are the robust standard errors.  * indicates significance at 5% and ** 
indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics: Vulnerability 
 
 Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Vulnerability 172 0.364 0.217 0 1 
HIV 157 1.069 2.478 0.06 18.705 
Ratio of Military 
Expenditure to GDP 158 2.037 1.652 0 8.98 
Inflation 170 5.783 7.052 -6.35 51.46 
Freedom index 170 0.762 0.262 0.08 1 
HDI 172 0.795 0.145 0.42 0.965 
GNI per capita 169 11724.670 13669.880 220 58050 
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Table 5. Partial correlation between variables: Vulnerability 
 
 Vulnerability HIV 
Ratio of 
Military 
Expenditure 
to GDP 
Inflation Freedom index HDI 
GNI per 
capita 
Vulnerability 1       
HIV 0.027 1      
Ratio of 
Military 
Expenditure to 
GDP 
0.104 -0.076 1     
Inflation 0.100 0.036 -0.031 1    
Freedom index -0.103 -0.142 -0.363* -0.232* 1   
HDI -0.124 -0.429* 0.016 -0.215* 0.672* 1  
GNI per capita -0.110 -0.222* -0.057 -0.357* 0.548* 0.716* 1 
Note: * indicates significance at 5% 
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Table 6. Random effects estimates: Vulnerability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HIV -2.3x10
-5 
(0.008) 
-0.002x10-1 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
Ratio of Military 
Expenditure to 
GDP 
0.017 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.016)  
0.010 
(0.016) 
Inflation 0.007* (0.002) 
0.007* 
(0.002) 
0.007* 
(0.002) 
0.009* 
(0.002) 
0.008* 
(0.002) 
Freedom index  -0.011 (0.087) 
0.037 
(0.151) 
-0.115 
(0.112) 
-0.129 
(0.117) 
HDI   -0.103 (0.292)   
GNI per capita 
(x10-6)    
4.13* 
(1.77) 
4.92* 
(1.77) 
Constant 
0.276* 
(0.042) 
 
0.286* 
(0.082) 
0.333* 
(0.162) 
0.347* 
(0.074) 
0.314* 
(0.092) 
Number of 
Observation 144 144 144 154 143 
No. of groups 74 74 74 79 74 
R2  (within) 0.060 0.059 0.057 0.232 0.217 
Wald test 10.94* 10.91* 11.63* 27.90* 26.13* 
P value of 
Hausman test 0.022 0.042 0.000 0.152 0.111 
P value Breusch 
Pagan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  The values in the parenthesis are the robust standard errors.   * indicates 
significance at 5%. 
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Table 7. Fixed effects estimates: Vulnerability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HIV 0.045 (0.078) 
0.037 
(0.074) 
0.055 
(0.069) 
0.039 
(0.096) 
0.015 
(0.058) 
Ratio of 
Military 
Expenditure 
to GDP 
-0.192 
(0.069) 
-0.174* 
(0.066) 
-0.127* 
(0.056)  
-0.148* 
(0.060) 
Inflation 0.006 (0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.008* 
(0.002) 
0.006* 
(0.002) 
Freedom 
index  
0.565** 
(0.322) 
0.148 
(0.279) 
0.421 
(0.276) 
0.475 
(0.296) 
HDI   5.587* (1.634)   
GNI per 
capita (x10-6)    
14.50* 
(1.40) 
13.50* 
(1.41) 
Constant 0.626 (0.152) 
0.176 
(0.294) 
-4.041* 
(1.302) 
-0.217 
(0.230) 
0.049 
(0.268) 
Number of 
Observation 144 144 144 154 143 
No. of groups 74 74 74 79 74 
R2  (within) 0.160 0.195 0.381 0.366 0.431 
F 6.19* 6.42* 7.59* 32.12* 29.37* 
      
Notes:  The values in the parenthesis are the robust standard errors.  * indicates significance 
at 5% and ** indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics: Irresilience 
 
Variables Observation Mean Standard Deviations Min Max 
Irresilience 86 0.547 0.225 0 1 
HIV 77 1.087 2.509 0.06 18.61 
HIV growth 77 0.057 0.180 -0.475 0.929 
Islam 
Dummy 86 0.174 0.382 0 1 
Africa 
Dummy 86 0.140 0.349 0 1 
ELF 53 32.434 28.363 1 89 
TB 86 127.512 183.333 2 888 
Freedom 
index 85 0.766 0.264 0.08 1 
HDI 86 0.798 0.146 0.421 0.965 
GNI per 
capita 84 12817.860 14887.110 250 58050 
Inequality 65 40.147 11.584 22.1 60.9 
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Table 9. Pair wise correlation among the variables: Irresilience 
 
 Irresilience HIV HIV growth 
Islam 
Dummy 
Africa 
Dummy ELF TB 
Freedom 
index HDI 
GNI per 
capita Inequality 
Irresilience 1           
HIV 0.296* 1          
HIV growth -0.021 -0.136 1         
Islam 
Dummy 0.347* -0.004 0.111 1        
Africa Dummy 0.351* 0.529* 0.074 0.434* 1       
ELF 0.361* 0.453* 0.268 0.209 0.264 1      
Tuberculosis 0.597* 0.640* -0.102 0.252* 0.582* 0.579* 1     
Freedom index -0.621* -0.159 -0.122 -0.546* -0.344* -0.412* -0.400* 1    
HDI -0.865* -0.436* 0.034 -0.400* -0.524* -0.577* -0.786* 0.667* 1   
GNI per capita -0.731* -0.222 -0.133 -0.241* -0.243* -0.413* -0.431* 0.541* 0.715* 1  
Inequality 0.549* 0.332* -0.119 0.134 0.258* 0.281 0.408* -0.622* -0.748* -0.684* 1 
Note: * indicates significance at 5% 
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Table 10. OLS estimates: Irresilience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
HIV 0.024 (0.018) 
0.015 
(0.010) 
0.063 
(0.051) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.026 
(0.016)  
HIV growth -0.034 (0.086) 
-0.099 
(0.085) 
-0.158 
(0.514) 
0.003x10-1 
(0.039) 
-0.167** 
(0.101) 
0.042 
(0.160)  
Islam 
Dummy 
0.208* 
(0.073) 
0.021 
(0.081) 
0.009 
(0.145) 
-0.036 
(0.051) 
-0.068 
(0.084) 
-0.037 
(0.071) 
-0.011 
(0.091) 
Africa 
Dummy 
0.039 
(0.096) 
0.034 
(0.077) 
0.016 
(0.116) 
-0.128* 
(0.057) 
0.173* 
(0.077) 
-0.059 
(0.060) 
0.020 
(0.081) 
Freedom 
index  
-0.501* 
(0.114) 
-0.248 
(0.343)   
-0.026 
(0.223) 
-0.278 
(0.234) 
ELF   -0.001 (0.001)   
-0.002* 
(0.0008) 
-0.001* 
(0.0006) 
HDI    -1.964* (0.277)  
-1.946* 
(0.376)  
GNI per 
capita (x10-6)     
-7.85* 
(2.28)  
-7.80* 
(2.44) 
Inequality   0.008* (0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002)   
Tuberculosis 
(x10-1)       
0.004* 
(0.002) 
Constant 0.486* (0.030) 
0.914* 
(0.108) 
0.350 
(0.428) 
2.270* 
(0.315) 
0.530* 
(0.119) 
2.210* 
(0.196) 
0.844* 
(0.179) 
Number of 
Observation 77 77 40 60 60 47 52 
R2 0.220 0.461 0.536 0.737 0.561 0.818 0.704 
F test 4.57* 18.42* 10.76* 28.77* 9.63* 42.74* 22.58* 
Notes:  The values in the parenthesis are the robust standard errors.  * indicates significance at 5% and ** 
indicates significance at 10%. 
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Appendix 
 
 
List of Countries: Fragility Data Set 
 
Country Country Country Country Country 
Algeria Denmark Ireland Mozambique Singapore 
Angola Dominican Republic Italy Myanmar Slovak Republic 
Argentina Ecuador Jamaica Namibia Slovenia 
Armenia Egypt Japan Netherlands South Africa 
Australia El Salvador Kazakhstan New Zealand Spain 
Austria Estonia Kenya Nicaragua Sri Lanka 
Azerbaijan Finland Kyrgyz Republic Nigeria Sudan 
Bangladesh France Latvia Norway Sweden 
Belarus Gambia, The Lebanon Pakistan Switzerland 
Belgium Georgia Lithuania Papua New Guinea Tajikistan 
Bolivia Germany Luxembourg Paraguay Tanzania 
Botswana Ghana Macedonia Peru Thailand 
Brazil Greece Madagascar Philippines Tunisia 
Cameroon Guatemala Malawi Poland Uganda 
Canada Honduras Malaysia Portugal Ukraine 
Chile Hungary Mali Romania United States 
China Iceland Mauritius Russia Uruguay 
Colombia India Mexico Senegal Uzbekistan 
Congo, Rep. Indonesia Moldova Serbia and Montenegro Venezuela, RB 
Cote d'Ivoire Iran Morocco Sierra Leone Zambia 
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List of Countries: Vulnerability and Resilience Data Set 
 
Country Country Country Country Country 
Argentina Czech Republic Israel New Zealand South Africa 
Australia Denmark Italy Nicaragua Spain 
Austria Dominican Repubic  Jamaica Nigeria Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh Egypt Japan Norway Sweden 
Barbados El Salvadore Jordan Pakistan Switzerland 
Belgium Estonia Kenya Panama Thailand 
Belize Finland Kuwait Papua New Guinea 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Bolivia France Latvia Paraguay Tunisia 
Brazil Germany Lithuania Peru Turkey 
Cameroon Greece Luxembourg Philippines Uganda 
Canada Honduras Madagascar Poland United Kingdom 
Chile Hong Kong Malaysia Portugal United States 
China Hungary Malta Romania Uruguay 
Colombia Iceland Mauritius Russian Venezuela 
Costa Rica India Mexico Senegal  
Cote d'ivoire Indonesia Morocco Singapore  
Croatia Iran, Nepal Slovak Republic  
Cyprus Ireland Netherlands Slovenia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
